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ABSTRACT: [128 words] 
We investigate a multinational corporation’s (MNC) decision to appoint host-country national 
(HCN) managers to foreign subsidiaries based on the institutional context of and familiarity 
with the host country. HCN managers are commonly associated with specialized knowledge, 
superior responsiveness, and higher legitimacy. Yet, we argue that local familiarity of HCNs 
can also be perceived as risky or harmful by MNC parents. We analyze how formal and informal 
institutions affect the trade-off between positive effects and potential costs associated with HCN 
managers (“Local allies” vs. “Trojan horses”). We find that legal institutions protect foreign 
MNCs from potential costs, encourage the use of HCNs and reinforce their benefits. Corruption 
and corruption distance, however, increase perceived costs associated with HCN managers up 
to a point at which they outweigh their perceived benefits. 
Keywords: Multinational corporations, subsidiary staffing, institutional theory, corruption, 
institutional distance  
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INTRODUCTION 
Multinational corporations (MNC) operate in countries that differ in their external institutional 
environments and often require specialized, local knowledge. At the same time they need to 
organize the internal institutional environment and manage their foreign subsidiaries across 
country borders (e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Roth and Kostova, 2003b). Subsidiary staffing 
is one important strategic instrument for MNCs to cope with the different environments. Ideally, 
subsidiary managers implement MNC strategies and act in the MNC’s interests, while they are 
also responsive to and knowledgeable about the external host-country environment. Unlike 
domestic staffing in independent firms, however, foreign subsidiary staffing is complicated by 
institutional duality (Kostova and Roth, 2002). A foreign subsidiary has to comply with 
strategic decisions of the MNC parent (i.e. within organization domain), and is exposed to the 
host-country institutional context (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Hence, foreign subsidiary 
managers face isomorphic pressures from two potentially competing domains. 
Researchers have found that expatriates can support MNC-internal integration. However, these 
managers may not be as knowledgeable about the host-country institutional context as host-
country national (HCN) managers (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003a, b). They do not possess 
contacts or legitimacy to an equal extent (Athanassiou and Nigh, 2000; Tan and Mahoney, 
2006). As a result, literature has widely agreed on the overall benefits of hiring HCNs (Mezias 
and Mezias, 2010), describing them as “a unique nonmarket strategic advantage” (White et al., 
2015, p. 343). 
Nevertheless, it is also widely acknowledged that the goals of individual managers and the 
MNC can be misaligned, and managers might act opportunistically (Kostova et al., 2016). 
Institutional duality can aggravate conflicts between the MNC, subsidiary managers and 
external stakeholders (e.g. cheap labor vs. well-paid jobs) (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Hence, 
institutional duality puts MNCs in a situation in which they are dependent on HCNs’ 
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knowledge, while at the same time facing higher information asymmetry about their behavior. 
This can be even more problematic for the MNC, when the host-country context does not 
protect from opportunistic behavior sufficiently (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Hearn, 2015; 
Marquis and Raynard, 2015). In such a situation of institutional duality, HCNs may be 
perceived as more risky or more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior by the MNC. As a 
result, MNCs may forego the benefits of HCNs in their foreign subsidiaries. 
MNC subsidiary staffing of top management teams and boards has attracted considerable 
scholarly interest. Yet, we believe the topic needs to be revisited for a number of reasons. First, 
subsidiary staffing literature has focused predominantly on the potential benefits of HCN 
subsidiary managers (Gaur et al., 2007; Tan and Mahoney, 2006) and board members (Du et 
al., 2015; Oxelheim et al., 2013). Little research has accounted for potential costs of HCN 
subsidiary managers as perceived by the MNC parent (notable exceptions being Shin et al., 
2016; Tan and Mahoney, 2006). In doing so, existing studies have oversimplified subsidiary 
staffing, hypothesizing unidirectional average effects, where, in fact, there are theoretically 
compelling arguments for higher-order relationships, i.e. trade-offs and curvilinear effects 
(Alcácer et al., 2013). In particular, research has failed to acknowledge the fact that HCNs may 
be perceived as more risky by the MNC, because they may use their superior knowledge and 
local contacts to the detriment of the MNC (Gong, 2003a). 
Second, some recent studies have used institutional theory to hypothesize about subsidiary 
staffing with HCNs or expatriates (Baik and Park, 2015; Gaur et al., 2007). These studies have 
examined the effects of differences between the MNC home- and subsidiary host-country 
institutional context. The effect of specific host-country institutions that potentially facilitate or 
protect from opportunistic behavior, however, remains under-examined (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016).  
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We aim to address these gaps integrating institutional theory (Doh et al., 2012; Henisz, 2000; 
Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2008). Following Granovetter (1978, 
1985) and Granovetter and Soong (1983), we contend that MNC subsidiary staffing with HCNs 
is characterized by a trade-off between their benefits of knowledge (local allies) and their costs 
resulting from potential opportunistic behavior, as perceived by the MNC parent (Trojan horse 
cost). By separating benefits and costs conceptually, we theorize about and empirically measure 
a trade-off in subsidiary staffing with HCN managers. 
However, empirical verification of potential cost associated with HCNs is of little value without 
understanding boundary conditions of variations in the cost (Alcácer et al., 2013). Hence, we 
hypothesize how the specific host-country institutional context in terms of corruption, 
corruption distance, property rights and contracting institutions, affects the cost of HCN 
managers as perceived by the MNC parent, and ultimately their net probability to be appointed 
(i.e. benefits minus cost) (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; La Porta et al., 1998; North, 1981; van 
Veen et al., 2014). Our study extends institutional subsidiary staffing literature by integrating 
the potential cost of HCNs and theorizing about institutional boundary conditions. By 
investigating host-country institutional mechanisms that can restrict the potential 
misappropriation of value from an MNC, our study also offers important managerial 
implications (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Siegel, 2007). 
We use a unique dataset covering 4,029 developing market subsidiaries to test our hypotheses 
on subsidiary staffing with HCNs. We identify non-linear effects, which are consistent with our 
trade-off argument and the hypothesized potential costs of HCN managers in environments with 
high corruption, low familiarity of the MNC and weak legal protection from opportunism. 
LITERATURE BACKGROUND 
Researchers have widely enhanced our understanding of the composition and diversity of top 
management teams and boards. They have theorized about aspects such as size (Carpenter et 
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al., 2004; de Andres et al., 2005), gender (Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Westphal and Milton, 
2000), and professional background or experience (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001; Kor and 
Misangyi, 2008; Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Yoo and Reed, 2015) in general firm staffing, 
as well as nationality (Gong, 2006; Masulis et al., 2012; Oxelheim et al., 2013; van Veen and 
Marsman, 2008; van Veen et al., 2014) in the context of MNC staffing in particular. Other 
studies have focused on consequences, finding evidence for a link between board or top 
management team composition and company performance (Carpenter et al., 2004; Certo et al., 
2006; Dalton et al., 1998), diversification (Greve et al., 2015; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; 
Tihanyi et al., 2000) and market entry strategies (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2011) in MNCs. Such 
studies have clearly identified staffing as a key strategic instrument. However, they have often 
looked into domestic staffing in independent firms in the absence of institutional duality. While 
scholars have emphasized the potential to transfer insights from research on domestic 
independent firms to MNC subsidiaries, they attest a need for theoretical adaptations (Alpay et 
al., 2005; Reuer et al., 2014). We claim that nationality of subsidiary managers (i.e. top 
management team and board members), in particular, is one such field that requires theoretical 
adaptations due to institutional duality. 
MNC subsidiary management staffing and institutional theory 
It is widely acknowledged that “multinational organizations are substantially different from 
domestic firms” (Kostova et al., 2008, p. 997), and more complex. Their organizational units 
are spread across institutional and country contexts, which often require local responsiveness 
and knowledge (e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Roth and Kostova, 2003a). After all, one of the 
most important roles of subsidiary managers is to connect to and bargain with host-country 
stakeholders, and thereby pursue the goals of the MNC (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Peng et 
al., 2008; Young et al., 2008). At the same time, however, the MNC needs to strive for 
integration of subsidiaries within the organization. For subsidiaries, this complexity implies a 
need to react to host-country pressures and cope with pressures from within the MNC. This 
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situation is referred to as institutional duality and differentiates foreign subsidiaries from 
independent firms (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
Institutional duality leads to a number of differences between managers of foreign subsidiaries 
and independent firms. First, subsidiary managers are affected by the liability of foreignness in 
the host country and, if expatriated they may not possess relevant host-country knowledge (e.g. 
Bjorkman et al., 2007). Second, subsidiary managers face external host-country interests (i.e. 
host-country domain) that often differ from MNC-parent interests. This makes MNCs a fruitful 
ground for theorizing from an institutional perspective (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Westney, 
1993). 
Researchers have acknowledged the complexity of the MNC and its influences on MNC 
subsidiary staffing. Gaur et al. (2007) and Baik and Park (2015), for instance, have examined 
how differences between MNC home- and host-country institutional contexts affect subsidiary 
staffing. By focusing on complexity deriving from cultural distance, however, most studies 
disregarded the effect of host-country institutions (a recent exception being Shin et al., 2016 , 
who theorized about the impact of the cultural context on subsidiary staffing). 
Comparative institutionalism suggests that business and social activities are organized 
consistently within national borders (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006; Whitley, 1999). Thus, 
national economies appear to be characterized by distinguishing sets of regulatory, cognitive 
and normative institutions (North, 1981, 2004). While institutional settings play an important 
role in international business, research has been criticized for oversimplifying the impact of the 
institutional context, viewing “institutional diversity as variation along discrete parameters at 
a high level of aggregation” (Jackson and Deeg, 2008, p. 545). Scholars have advocated a more 
fine-grained approach to theorizing and analyzing the impact of institutions on firm strategies. 
We follow their line of thought. More specifically, we study the impact of particular types of 
informal and legal institutions (namely corruption, corruption distance, and property rights 
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institutions, contracting institutions), which are directly related to the perceived costs associated 
with subsidiary managers’ nationality. 
MNC subsidiary management staffing and manager nationality 
Previous research suggests that subsidiary management may take on a number of different roles 
within the MNC. It is important in managing an MNC’s relations with external stakeholders 
and/or monitor internal compliance of subsidiary staff in the host-country context (Du et al., 
2015; Leksell and Lindgren, 1982). Moreover, MNC subsidiary management staffing is 
described as “a primary strategic means for MNCs to share knowledge, to coordinate activities, 
and to exercise control over their subsidiaries” (Gaur et al., 2007, p. 613). In particular, 
subsidiary management staffing allows MNCs to promote strategic goals by appointing 
appropriate managers, who act in their interests (Gaur et al., 2007). However, the question 
remains as to what constitutes appropriateness? One theoretically important characteristic that 
relates to institutional duality is a manager’s nationality. 
MNC subsidiary staffing literature is suggestive about the potential benefits of HCN and 
expatriate managers (e.g. Gong, 2003b; Harzing, 2001; Widmier et al., 2008). Thus, depending 
on the MNC’s needs, for instance, for local responsiveness versus control, the appointment of 
HCN subsidiary managers is seen as more or less appropriate. HCNs have been accredited with 
a number of advantages: They provide the MNC with access to networks (i.e. social capital), 
specialized host-country knowledge, and legitimacy (Du et al., 2011, 2015; Luo and Shenkar, 
2011). Furthermore, they may be more responsive to changes in the host country (Colakoglu 
and Jiang, 2013), and potentially more efficient in monitoring local subsidiary staff. Finally, 
HCNs were found to signal an MNC’s commitment to stakeholders in a host country (Kriger, 
1988; Kriger and Rich, 1987). This can in turn reduce its liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). 
Expatriated managers, on the contrary, may often lack such host-country-specific benefits. In 
fact, they are often treated less favorably by host-country stakeholders (Kostova and Zaheer, 
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1999; Zaheer, 1995). Hence, when an MNC strives for efficient interaction with external 
stakeholders in the host-country context, HCN subsidiary managers (i.e. local allies, as we refer 
to them) are arguably the more appropriate choice. This is especially true in developing markets, 
where weak, ambiguous, or discriminating institutions preclude MNCs from fully exploiting 
their firm-specific advantages. In such contexts, MNCs require both specialized knowledge and 
local networks (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this narrative of local allies is based on the assumption that HCNs invariably use 
their superior abilities for the benefit of the MNC. Institutional theory, however, provides 
compelling arguments that speak against the unconditional benefits of HCN managers. In fact, 
HCNs can be argued to have superior abilities, incentives and opportunities to abuse their 
position at the expense of the MNC. First, HCNs’ knowledge of the host-country context might 
give them superior opportunities to collude with external stakeholders, or obtain personal 
benefits by misappropriating value from the MNC (Granovetter, 1985; Provan, 1993; Uzzi, 
1997). Second, HCNs’ embeddedness in the socio-economic context makes them more 
vulnerable to external pressures. Granovetter (1985, p. 491), for instance, emphasized that 
“social relations […] may even provide occasion and means for malfeasance and conflict on a 
scale larger than in their absence”. HCNs are thus more likely to be coerced by stakeholders 
to damage the MNC, even if they did not have bad intentions themselves. In fact, social 
pressures were found to go along with fraud, cronyism and illegal activities (Daboub et al., 
1995; Zahra et al., 2007). Third, socio-economic embeddedness suggests that HCNs are more 
closely attached to host-country interests. Thus, HCNs have higher incentives to transfer value 
from the MNC to external stakeholders. In sum and despite clear benefits, institutional theory 
suggests that HCNs may be, or at least may be perceived by MNC parent managers as, less 
reliable (i.e. Trojan horses, as we refer to them). 
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Previous research on subsidiary manager nationality focused almost exclusively on the potential 
benefits from HCNs’ knowledge, responsiveness and legitimacy (Boddewyn, 1988; Du et al., 
2011, 2015). Yet, institutional theory suggests costs of HCNs that MNC parents take into 
account when they make subsidiary staffing decisions. Focusing on either only benefits or cost 
of HCNs, subsidiary management staffing is conceptually oversimplified. More specifically, 
ignoring either side of the trade-off omits a theoretically and empirically important variable. In 
the worst case, such omission leads to over-generalizing the benefits of HCNs and to 
empirically spurious results. We argue thus that subsidiary staffing with HCN managers should 
be conceptualized as a trade-off, accounting for both potential benefits and cost of HCNs. We 
follow Haans et al. (2015) in theoretically spelling out both benefit and cost functions, and 
hypothesize on the net probability of HCN subsidiary managers to be appointed by an MNC 
parent (i.e. benefit minus cost). This allows us to contest the prevailing linearity assumption 
and over-generalization of the benefits of HCNs. 
Acknowledging average costs that need to be balanced with the benefits of HCNs, however, 
has little managerial value in itself. Rather, we need to understand the institutional 
contingencies under which the costs associated with HCNs are perceived as high or low by an 
MNC parent (Alcácer et al., 2013). Hence, we theorize about the cost associated with HCN 
managers from an institutional perspective (Kostova et al., 2008; North, 2004; Scott, 1995): We 
argue that the cost of HCNs as perceived by an MNC parent is a function of the host-country 
institutional context, as it determines the opportunities for, the familiarity with, and the 
protection from opportunistic behavior. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
One key argument in our paper is that HCNs provide a multitude of potential benefits to foreign 
subsidiaries. Such benefits include knowledge, contacts, responsiveness, diversity and 
legitimacy, which to some degree transcend legal institutional contexts. While not strictly 
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necessary for determining the shape of the net effect, we propose that the benefits of HCNs are 
marginally decreasing. As the proportion of HCN subsidiary managers increases, there is 
considerable overlap in their knowledge and contacts, and we expect the benefits attributed to 
HCNs to diminish. 
In addition, we simultaneously consider and hypothesize about the potential or perceived costs 
of HCNs associated with opportunistic behavior. Activities of opportunistic behavior may range 
from outright illegal activities, such as stealing corporate funds, to providing locals or 
competitors with important information (e.g. bidding information, insider information, 
technological know-how), misuse of corporate resources to extend favors to suppliers, 
customers and politicians (e.g. supply contracts, infrastructure, expense accounts, cronyism 
hiring). Unlike the broader benefits, the perceived costs of HCNs clearly depend on the 
perceived opportunities for illicit behavior in the host country, the ability of the MNC to monitor 
subsidiary managers, and the perceived protection provided by host-country legal institutions. 
Subtracting these contextually-determined cost functions from the benefit function allows us to 
hypothesize about, and test for the net probability of HCNs to be appointed as subsidiary 
managers by an MNC parent (following Haans et al., 2015). The question remains, which 
institutional characteristics are theoretically most important in explaining potential costs related 
to opportunistic behavior by HCNs from the perspective of MNC parents. 
More recently, institutional researchers have advocated for a more fine-grained approach to 
theorizing about and measuring the impact of institutions on MNC strategic management (Berry 
et al., 2010; Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Salomon and Wu, 2012). Accordingly, each research 
question “require[s] the use of different [institutional] dimensions” (Berry et al., 2010, p. 1477) 
that are based on theoretical reasoning. In line with this literature, we study the impact of 
specific types of institutions on MNC subsidiary management staffing, rather than the impact 
of broad proxies. More specifically, we focus on institutions with a more immediate influence 
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on the costs associated with Trojan horses from the viewpoint of an MNC parent: prevalence 
of corrupt practices, internal monitoring capabilities due to an MNC’s familiarity with the host 
country, and external protection from opportunism by private individuals (i.e. managers or 
stakeholders) and public stakeholders (i.e. government officials) (Meyer et al., 2009; Patibandla 
and Petersen, 2002). 
Cost of HCNs and corruption perception 
Corruption comprises uncodified customs, societal norms, practices or “implicit rules of the 
game” (North, 2004; Tonoyan et al., 2010, p. 804). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016, p. 36) broadly 
defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. It has been found to 
influence MNC strategy especially in developing countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008, 2016; 
Martin et al., 2007; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Weitzel and Berns, 2006). Corruption also 
directly relates to the Trojan horse argument. From the perspective of MNC parents that make 
subsidiary staffing decisions, a subsidiary manager’s exposure to a certain level of corruption 
in the host country determines his or her opportunities for opportunistic behavior. Irrespective 
of actual costs of HCN opportunistic behavior, hence, an MNC parent will probably consider 
hiring HCN subsidiary managers as more risky when it perceives high host-country corruption. 
Corruption is implicit and uncodified in nature. Coping with corruption, thus, requires some 
country-specific knowledge and contacts, and is somewhat discriminatory against foreigners 
(Zaheer, 1995). As the level of host-country corruption increases, MNCs have to deal with an 
even more uncodified and ambiguous host-country context. As a reaction, the value of HCNs 
from the viewpoint of an MNC parent increases (benefit function): By hiring HCN subsidiary 
managers, MNCs can acquire contacts as well as specialized knowledge about the functioning 
of corruption in the host country. Again, it is important to stress that the benefits of HCNs are 
very broad and not solely linked to participating in corruption. However, such a possibility 
would increase the benefits of HCNs, while fully maintaining our trade-off argument on the 
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cost side. Thus, we expect that the proportion of HCNs increases with the level of host-country 
corruption (as illustrated in the benefit function in Figure 1). 
In line with our Trojan horse argument, however, there are also potential costs associated with 
HCN subsidiary managers in corrupt host countries. According to Granovetter (1978) and 
Granovetter and Soong (1983), widely accepted social behavior is likely to be reproduced by 
other individuals and institutions. Similarly, Spencer and Gomez (2011, p. 282) note: “When 
managers perceive that a corrupt practice […] has become institutionalized in a society, they 
are more likely to conform to those societal expectations to obtain legitimacy.” Thus, the higher 
the level of host-country corruption, the more likely an MNC parent will expect HCNs to 
engage in corrupt behavior too. Moreover, due to their social contacts, HCNs are perceived as 
being more easily able to identify counterparties to misappropriate value from the MNC. 
Corrupt practices that can be used to the detriment of an MNC will probably influence 
subsidiary staffing decisions by means of perceived costs of HCNs. 
As stated by Granovetter (1985, p. 491), “in the business world, certain crimes, such as 
embezzling, are simply impossible for those who have not built up relationships of trust that 
permit the opportunity to manipulate accounts.” In general, being socio-economically 
embedded and emotionally attached to the host-county context, HCN managers may be 
perceived as more likely to trade-off MNC for other interests. Finally, HCNs knowledge of 
host-country practices potentially allows them to collude with external parties more easily. In 
sum, under high levels of corruption, otherwise valuable local allies may be, or at least may be 
perceived by MNC parent managers, as Trojan horses, or conduits of collusion. Thus, the 
potential Trojan horse problem associated with HCN subsidiary managers becomes more 
pressing with increasing levels of corruption (Figure 1). It is not a necessary precondition for 
the shape of the net effect, but we propose that the perceived cost of HCN managers are likely 
increasing with the proportion of HCNs, resulting in a concave cost function (illustrated in 
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Figure 1). A single HCN manager may have the knowledge and contact to abuse his or her 
position, but is constrained by non-HCNs’ monitoring. As the proportion of HCNs increases, 
monitoring becomes more difficult from the viewpoint of the MNC parent. In the worst case, 
HCNs collude and the MNC fears a subsidiary culture of opportunism. 
This illustrates the trade-off between HCNs’ potential roles as local allies and Trojan horses 
that MNCs face in subsidiary management staffing. According to Haans et al. (2015), such a 
strategic trade-off resembles a higher-order net effect. More specifically, the cost function is 
subtracted from the benefit function to arrive at the net effect of HCN managers (illustrated in 
row one in Figure 1). Combining the two mechanisms suggests that the proportion of HCN 
subsidiary managers exhibits an inverted u-shape or concave net effect with regard to the level 
of host-country corruption (Haans et al., 2015). This indicates that the marginal benefit of 
additional HCNs’ knowledge and social capital is at some point outweighed by their risks of 
collusive behavior as perceived by the MNC parent (Benito et al., 2005; Shin et al., 2016; Tan 
and Mahoney, 2006). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H1: The relationship between the proportion of HCN subsidiary managers and corruption 
in the host country is inversely u-shaped. 
Cost of HCNs and MNC familiarity with host-country corruption 
An MNC’s assessment and perception of HCNs’ costs also depends on the MNC’s familiarity 
with the host-country environment, and the degree to which it is capable of monitoring HCNs 
(Colakoglu and Caligiuri, 2008; Gong, 2003a; Tomassen et al., 2012). Previous literature has 
frequently operationalized familiarity by using measures of cultural distance between MNC 
home and host countries (Bae and Salomon, 2010; Berry et al., 2010). While cultural distance 
proxies an MNC’s ability to interpret and understand local norms, distance in levels of 
corruption offers a more direct operationalization of ability to prevent opportunistic behavior. 
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There is no theoretical argument that the broad benefits HCNs will turn negative with 
decreasing familiarity. Rather, extant literature suggests that it might actually boost the value 
of locally knowledgeable managers, when the MNC lacks host-country knowledge about 
corruption (Shin et al., 2016). Hence, we continue to hypothesize a positive benefit function of 
HCNs with increasing levels of unfamiliarity. Familiarity with the host-country level of 
corruption, however, clearly affects the cost function of HCNs (Benito et al., 2005). When 
MNC home- and host-country contexts are similar, the MNC parent can more easily monitor 
HCN subsidiary managers. This reduces the MNC parent’s perceived costs of HCNs (Benito et 
al., 2005). As familiarity decreases, monitoring becomes more difficult: This in turn results in 
an increase in the perceived costs of HCNs (illustrated in Figure 1). Again, it is not a necessary 
assumption, but we propose that the costs associated with HCNs marginally increase with 
unfamiliarity of the MNC, which leads to a convex cost function (as also argued by Shin et al., 
2016). This is, because monitoring becomes more difficult with higher distance and an 
increasing proportion of HCNs. 
Following the same linear addition of the cost and benefit functions as before, we thus 
hypothesize an inversely u-shaped net effect between corruption distance and HCN subsidiary 
managers (as illustrated in the second row of Figure 1). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H2: The relationship between the proportion of HCN subsidiary managers and corruption 
distance is inversely u-shaped. 
Cost of HCNs and MNC legal protection  
Internal monitoring is not the only means to prevent opportunistic behavior of HCNs. Rather, 
host countries themselves can offer legal institutions to protect MNCs from opportunistic 
behavior. Again, there is no theoretical argument suggesting that the manifold potential benefits 
of HCN managers will cease or even turn negative, when legal protection is in place. The benefit 
function of HCNs remains essentially untouched. HCN still provide benefits of superior 
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responsiveness to local customers and politics, higher legitimacy and knowledge to the intricate 
local context, irrespective of the legal frameworks that protect MNCs. 
On the cost side, however, codified and enforced laws can protect MNCs against Trojan horse 
costs and therefore affect perceptions of MNCs. Qi et al. (2010), for instance, show that legal 
institutions can reduce problems associated with corruption and expropriation. If non-
discriminatory legal protection is in place and executed by appropriate bodies in a host country, 
MNCs are ex-ante protected from illicit behavior. Furthermore, MNCs can resort to laws ex-
post to recover misappropriated value. Famously, Granovetter (1985, p. 489) describes the 
effect of institutions on illicit behavior as follows: “Malfeasance is […] seen to be averted 
because clever institutional arrangements make it too costly.” This suggests that formalized 
laws directly influence the perceived cost of HCNs. However, in his observation Granovetter 
(1985) is rather unspecific about the types of institutions. We draw on fine-grained institutional 
dimensions, namely institutions that protect MNCs from opportunistic behavior. More 
specifically, we follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who distinguish between contracting 
and property rights institutions. 
Contracting institutions govern exchange relationships between private parties. They refer to 
the cost and formalities involved in “contract enforcement when the defendant has no 
justification and avoids payment” (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, p. 951). These institutions 
are especially important, because they determine whether or not, to what extent, and at what 
cost the MNC is able to seek legal recourse for illicit behavior. When contracting institutions 
are efficient, the perceived costs of HCNs are low or even fully eliminated (as illustrated in the 
cost function in Figure 1). 
While contracting institutions relate to the MNC’s ability to have legal recourse and reclaim 
losses accruing from private stakeholders, property rights protect “against expropriation by the 
government and powerful elites” (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, p. 949). Similar to contracting 
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institutions, efficient property rights institutions decrease or fully eliminate the perceived cost 
of Trojan horses, who may collude with host-country government officials (as illustrated in the 
cost function in Figure 1).With efficient institutions in place, the cost of Trojan horses weigh 
less or ideally turn zero. 
In both cases, the cost function of HCNs is decreasing or ideally even equal zero. This results 
in an overall positive net effect of HCNs (as illustrated in the third and fourth rows of Figure 
1). In the ideal case, there are theoretical reasons why legal institutions encourage MNCs to 
hire HCNs, which could lead to a u-shaped net effect of HCNs. In case that an MNC parent 
perceives reliable legal protection against Trojan horses in a host country, MNCs would base 
their subsidiary management staffing decision predominantly on the benefits of locally 
knowledgeable allies. We thus hypothesize: 
H3: When the contracting institutions in a host country provide high protection, the 
proportion of HCN subsidiary managers is higher. 
H4: When the property right institutions in a host country provide high protection, the 
proportion of HCN subsidiary managers is higher. 
We explicitly do not hypothesize about the presence of a non-linear effect in the case of MNC 
legal protection. The reason is that unlike corruption, which is implicit and uncodified, formal 
institutions are codified, explicit and executed by authorities. Hence, they protect MNCs from 
Trojan horses, essentially cancelling the cost function associated with HCNs, while fully 
maintaining their benefits (Figure 1). As a result, there is no theoretical reason to expect that 
costs outweigh benefits at some point of protection, and no theoretical argument for a non-
linear effect of formal institutions. Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical model, illustrating cost 
and benefit functions for HCNs as functions of institutional context and distance. 
----------------------- 
Figure 1 
------------------------ 
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EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA 
Dataset 
We compiled a dataset of foreign-owned subsidiaries located in developing countries from the 
Orbis database (Bureau Van Dijk). Developing countries were identified in accordance with the 
International Monetary Fund’s definition (IMF, 2015, p. 151-152). We did not include 
subsidiaries located in the country of the parent, since domestically-owned subsidiaries are not 
subject to institutional duality (Kostova and Roth, 2002)1. A subsidiary is defined as a company 
that has a foreign MNC parent (i.e. located in a different country) with a controlling stake (i.e. 
at least 50% plus one share), more than 5 million USD in reported sales and, at least, 10 
employees (for a similar approach see Shin et al., 2016). Consequently, our definition excludes 
small subsidiaries and 50-50 joint ventures. Only 22% of our observations have ownership 
shares of less than 90%, and only 12% of them have ownership shares between 60 and 50.1%. 
The foreign parent company is identified using the same 50% plus one share-rule but includes 
possible higher-level paths (i.e. when a foreign owner itself is majority-owned, its second-level 
company is considered as the parent). 
Our search yielded 5,398 foreign subsidiaries. Yet, as we had missing values for some of those 
subsidiaries (e.g. missing manager information), we were left with a full sample of 4,029 
subsidiaries (75% of the initial sample) for our analysis. Using t-tests, we found that the 
subsidiaries in our full sample are on average larger than the originally identified 5,398 
subsidiaries (both in terms of sales and number of employees). Thus, our results may be 
generalizable rather towards larger foreign-owned subsidiaries. 
Our subsidiaries are located in 50 different developing countries, exhibiting substantial variance 
regarding the key institutional factors in our study. Large shares of our subsidiaries are located 
                                                            
1 In the absence of institutional duality, the firm is fully familiar with the context (H2), and is not relying on legal protection 
to an equal extent (H3 and H4).  
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in Malaysia (24%), Czech Republic (13%), Thailand (13%), and Romania (10%). We checked 
whether our sample (n = 4,029) differed from the 5,398 originally identified subsidiaries in 
terms of the distribution across countries. Indeed we found that our sample is biased positively 
towards Romania, Russia, Malaysia, Thailand, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, in which a 
large share of subsidiaries report management data, whereas subsidiaries in China, India, Brazil, 
Philippines and Morocco underreport. 
Studies that examine subsidiary staffing inevitably run into potential biases on both the 
company and the country level, since reporting of top management varies across companies and 
countries. Essentially, the empirical trade-off boils down to the simultaneous need to maintain 
country-level variance of our independent variables (i.e. including a large number of countries), 
while avoiding countries with possible reporting bias (i.e. including only countries with high 
coverage). Using the full-sample data inevitably includes companies from countries with low 
reporting rates, which may induce bias. More conservatively, studies can choose countries with 
high reporting rates (i.e. low company-level bias), but lower generalizability across countries, 
for their sample. To address reporting-bias issues, we chose a dual approach. First, we 
conducted our main analysis with a more conservative sample of countries with low company-
level bias (n = 4,000). We defined countries with extensive reporting as those 14 countries, 
where at least five percent of all foreign-owned subsidiaries, irrespective of size and 
employment, reported full information on managers (n = 12,350)2. Only after using this 
conservative sample, we run our analysis with the full sample that includes all countries with 
potentially higher company-level, but lower country-level bias. Tables 1-3 show industry-
sector, home- and host-country distributions of our full sample. 
----------------------- 
Insert Tables 1-3 
------------------------ 
                                                            
2 We ran further robustness checks, whereby we included only countries, for which we had a minimum of 90% (30 
countries), 50% (44 countries) or 30% (47 countries) of firm coverage for our full sample of 4,232 foreign subsidiaries. 
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Measures 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the proportion of HCNs in subsidiary top 
management as of 2015. We derive it from information about top managers and board members 
in the Orbis database. Our data includes 16,244 top managers and board members. We exclude 
all staff, whose job description does not include the terms “executive”, “officer”, “chair”, 
“head of”, or “chief”. For further analyses, we calculate the same variables separately for top 
managers and board members. This allows us to capture heterogeneity across potentially 
different roles of managers.  
Independent variables. We use Transparency International (2015) Corruption Perception 
Index to measure host-country corruption. The use of a perceived measure is warranted, 
because staffing decisions of the foreign parent are most likely to be influenced by their 
perception of the host country. Yet, the measure is more narrowly focused on public sector 
corruption and thus does not capture all facets or types of corruption. However, as a publicly 
available country-level index it is frequently used and arguably instrumental in shaping foreign 
perceptions of business practices and as a consequence MNC staffing decisions. The index is 
an inverse measure of corruption between 0 and 100, with Denmark being the least corrupt 
country in the world (91). We inverted the measure to reflect exposure to corruption, i.e. higher 
values mean higher corruption. Corruption distance is measured as the absolute difference in 
corruption between the MNC host- and its home-country. A German (2.1) subsidiary in Mexico 
(4.9), for example, has a corruption distance of 2.8. We use absolute distance, because our 
theoretical mechanism is related to familiarity with the host-country level of corruption (Berry 
et al., 2010; Salomon and Wu, 2012). The maximum degree of familiarity is zero distance for 
an MNC investing in its home-country. Using relative rather than absolute distances would 
imply that an MNC from a low-corruption country investing into a high-corruption country is 
more familiar with the level of corruption than HCNs themselves (negative distance). 
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Regarding formal institutions, we follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). More specifically, we 
use the legal formalism index developed in Djankov et al. (2003) as a measure of contracting 
institutions3. We invert the measure so that it reflects ease, or quality of contract enforcement. 
To capture property rights institutions, we use protection against expropriation (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005). This is based on Polity IV’s “constraint on the executive”-measure by Marshall 
and Gurr (2012). The measure is scaled as a quality measure. Both measures are prominently 
used in political economy (Djankov, La Porta, et al., 2008) and finance literature (Djankov, 
Hart, et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2007; Qi et al., 2010), suggesting high reliability and 
comparability. On the negative side, the data has not been updated recently, and we are forced 
to accept time inconsistency on these measures4. We standardized all institutional variables, in 
order to allow for a meaningful interpretation of the direct effects of the models including square 
terms (UCLA, 2016). 
Control variables. By nature of our institutional research question, we are faced with multi-
level data. We seek to control for characteristics on both the country and company-level 
following similar research (e.g. Shin et al., 2016) and we run additional robustness checks to 
account for the hierarchical nature of our data. We control for a wide range of variables on 
different levels of analysis. With regard to the subsidiary level, we control for subsidiary 
profitability using last year’s EBIT scaled by subsidiary assets, because profitable subsidiaries 
may offer more opportunities for misappropriation of profits. We run robustness checks using 
three- and ten-year average EBIT and operating profits. Eight subsidiaries had not existed for 
ten years, so we used maximum available year-observations. Interestingly, subsidiary 
profitability is positively, but insignificantly correlated with the presence of HCNs. This lends 
                                                            
3 Unfortunately, the indices are not available for the year 2015 and we had to resort to the most recent data (i.e. 2003). Such 
issues can introduce bias, but given the low variation across time in measures of legal institutions, we are confident that such 
issues do not drive our results across multiple countries. 
4 We do not consider this time inconsistency to drive our results for two reasons. First, legal institutions develop rather 
slowly with little year-to-year variation. Second, staffing decisions are unlikely driven by single-year changes, but rather by 
long-term trends. Finally, there is a general trend towards improving legal institutions. Hence, identifying significant country-
level effects, while using current staffing data, is likely to be more conservative. 
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support to our core argument that average benefits of HCNs may be positive overall, but 
conditional on the institutional context. On the level of the subsidiary, we also control for the 
size of the management team in terms of the total number of managers.  
We control for subsidiary size in terms of sales (assets and employees as alternative measures 
for robustness checks) (Boyacigiller, 1990), and subsidiary industry using NACE 2 
classifications. We control for subsidiary age, as the use of HCNs was shown to decrease over 
time (Boyacigiller, 1990; Collings et al., 2008; Lynall et al., 2003; Shin et al., 2016). Moreover, 
we add subsidiary’s extent of debt financing, because it determines both the degree of external 
monitoring by banks (Chung et al., 2005; Datta et al., 1999), and the availability of free cash 
flows for managers to misappropriate funds (Jensen, 1989). It is possible that subsidiary staffing 
decisions depend on the distribution of the residual ownership structure of the subsidiary. In 
subsidiaries with more dispersed minority shares, possibly across shareholders in the host 
country, staffing may be different from subsidiaries with a single strong minority shareholder. 
Research also found a relationship between staffing and firm ownership (Oxelheim et al., 2013). 
Therefore, we include the number of shareholders of the subsidiary as a measure of shareholder 
concentration, and the direct ownership share of the parent. While caution needs to be applied 
to this variable since large publicly owned companies commonly only provide estimates of the 
number of shareholders, it is well suited to distinguish subsidiaries with highly dispersed from 
those with highly concentrated residual ownership. 
Moreover, we control for MNC parent-level factors, namely the overall number of subsidiaries 
in the MNC (i.e. the number of recorded subsidiaries with the same MNC parent) as an indicator 
of MNC internationalization experience. We also include a MNC size measure of total assets 
(employees as an alternative measure) in our robustness checks. Furthermore, we obtain the 
number of shareholders of the parent to control for potential differences in subsidiary staffing 
between MNCs with highly dispersed public ownership, and MNCs with lean ownership 
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structures and dominant owners (Boyacigiller, 1990). Finally and quite conservatively, we 
include a measure of geographic distance between the MNC parent and the subsidiary to 
account for difficulties that MNCs may have in monitoring the subsidiary. As geographic 
distance is not independent from our independent variables, it may capture some of the 
hypothesized country-level differences (Brouthers et al., 2016). We run robustness checks with 
measures of cultural distance (Berry et al., 2010).  
One key issue in subsidiary staffing is staffing culture or strategy. We try to capture MNC-
specific staffing culture. For that purpose, we have extracted data on all reported subsidiaries 
of the same MNC parent from the Orbis database. We then calculated the average proportion 
of HCNs across these subsidiaries. This variable allows us to analyze staffing in our subsidiaries 
compared to an MNC’s average subsidiary staffing culture. The variable proxies MNC-level 
staffing culture, and stands in marked contrast to proxies of national culture that “implicitly 
assume lack of corporate culture variance” (Shenkar, 2001, p. 524). In theory, corporate culture 
is superior to measures of national culture, because it accounts for possible firm-level 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we test for robustness including cultural distance and home-
country fixed effects. 
On the host-country level, we control for several other aspects. First, we control for the 
availability of qualified HCNs in the host-country context, using the share of a country’s 
population with tertiary education from the UN World Development Indicator (2014 or most 
recent). We include each host country’s average ten-year GDP growth from the UN World 
Development Indicators to capture growth options. In addition, and following Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005), we control for the origin of the host-country legal system. We differentiate 
between English, French, or German host-country legal traditions, as the legal context might 
have an effect on staffing. Tables 4-6 show descriptive statistics, pairwise correlations and 
variable descriptions.  
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----------------------- 
Insert Tables 4-6 
------------------------ 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To account for the truncation of our dependent variable as a proportional measure between zero 
and one, we run heteroskedastic fractional response models (GLM) with a probit link and robust 
standard errors (Williams, 2016; Wooldridge, 2011). Our dependent variable in the fractional 
response model is the percentage of HCN subsidiary managers. The coefficients in our models 
can be interpreted as percentage increases or decreases. Because of naturally high correlations, 
we include institutional variables in a stepwise manner, before we run a full model. For our 
hypothesized curvilinear effects, we follow the empirical standards published by Haans et al. 
(2015).  
Table 7 illustrates the stepwise models for our conservative, reduced sample of 4,000 
subsidiaries. Due to missing information on subsidiary age and profitability, we lose 686 
observations. Model 1 shows that host-country corruption is significantly associated with a 
higher proportion of HCNs. A one standard deviation increase in host-country corruption, 
which is roughly equivalent to a move from Czech Republic to India, is associated with an 
increase in HCN subsidiary managers of 45%. This supports our argument of local allies, i.e. 
HCNs provide important knowledge and contacts that are necessary to conduct business in host 
countries characterized by high corruption. However, and in line with our arguments, due to the 
non-linearity of the effect such an interpretation is grossly overgeneralizing. In Model 2, we 
add the squared term of host-country corruption to test if the benefits of HCNs are outweighed 
at some point by perceived costs. We find evidence for an inverted u-shape or concave 
relationship between host-country corruption and the proportion of HCNs (p = 0.000). This 
supports our Hypothesis 1. MNCs in our sample appoint up to 80% of HCNs in countries with 
medium corruption, but this share decreases to only 20% in countries with high corruption 
perception. We use an incremental Wald test to check for improvement of fit. The F-Test of 
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36.19 (p = 0.000) indicates that the quadratic term significantly improves model fit. The 
inversely u-shaped effect clearly illustrates the importance of modelling the net effect of HCNs 
as a trade-off: Focusing on the benefits only, while omitting potential costs, leads to an 
overestimation of the benefits of HCNs, which in the worst case can be potentially negative in 
countries with very high corruption. Also, it illustrates that estimating an average benefit of 
HCNs leads to a false generalization in that it is assumed that these benefits apply throughout 
the whole variation of institutional contexts, irrespective of the scale of corruption.  
----------------------- 
Insert Table 7 
----------------------- 
In Model 3, we add corruption distance as a measure of MNC familiarity, i.e. the absolute 
distance in corruption between MNC home and host country. Our results strongly support the 
notion that higher distance or unfamiliarity in terms of corruption between the MNC parent 
location and a host country increases the benefit of host-country knowledge, and in turn the 
proportion of HCNs (p < 0.000). A one standard deviation increase in corruption distance is 
associated with an increase of 14% HCNs. Again, this linear effect makes a crucial omission, 
assuming that the effect is linear and applies to all degrees of familiarity, irrespective of 
potential monitoring problems. Therefore, we include the quadratic term of corruption distance 
in Model 4 to check if costs outweigh benefits at some point. We find very strong support for 
our Hypothesis 2 and the inversely u-shaped relationship (p < 0.000). Again, we ran an 
incremental Wald test, to see whether the polynomial term of corruption distance improves 
model fit. The F-score is 21.89 (p < 0.000), indicating a significant improvement in fit, which 
strongly supports the presence of the inverse u-shape relationship between corruption distance 
and the proportion of HCNs. Both results on the squared term attest that the benefits of HCNs 
are not linear, as often hypothesized. Rather, their benefits are outweighed by potential costs in 
the presence of high corruption or low familiarity.  
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In Models 5 and 6, we add contracting and property rights institutions respectively, as our 
measures of MNC protection. There is no data available for Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia and 
Lithuania, which reduces our sample to 3,114 subsidiaries. Our results support Hypothesis 3, 
i.e. that MNCs appoint more HCNs when there are well-functioning contracting institutions in 
place (p < 0.000). A one standard deviation increase in host-country contracting institutions is 
associated with a 69% increase in HCNs. In Model 6, we add the measure of host-country 
property rights as an indicator of protection from government expropriation. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, we find that MNCs increase the use of HCNs in the presence of well-functioning, 
strong property rights (p < 0.000). The effect is slightly lower than for contracting institutions 
with a 56% increase. Our data allows us to rule out non-linear effects empirically, providing 
support for our argument that legal institutions reduce Trojan horse costs. Indeed, the Wald Test 
does not indicate a u-shape. In the case of property rights, we even found an increasing marginal 
proportion of HCNs (p = 0.0288), suggesting that such institutions can actually boost the 
benefits of HCNs.  
Finally, in Model 7 we include all institutional measures jointly. The results mirror our results 
of the stepwise regressions, though with some variation in coefficient sizes and significances. 
In particular, we find strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, which both acknowledge the cost-
benefit trade-off in subsidiary management staffing, and underline the potential Trojan horse 
problem5. Due to the high collinearity between institutional measures, standard errors are 
inflated, while the parameter estimates in Model 7 are unbiased (Cohen et al., 2013). Hence, 
Model 7 is conservative in that significances are more difficult to achieve, whereas coefficients 
are largely unaffected, supporting our hypothesized trade-off. The effect of host-country 
                                                            
5 Note that the opposing sign on the direct effect of corruption in Model 7 indicates the slope conditional on corruption = 0, 
and is formally determined by differentiating the regression equation y = b0 + b1*x + b2*x2 with respect to x (i.e. y' = b1 + 
2*b2*x) (UCLA, 2016). Hence, the change in sign does not represent a reversal of the direct effect, but corresponds to a shift 
in the inverted u-shape from below to slightly above the mean of our standardized measure of corruption (mean = 0). That is 
due to additional countries in the sample. The concave shape of the effect of corruption is maintained and significant, as 
evidenced by the squared term in Model 7. 
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property rights institutions turns negative and insignificant in Model 7. The effect of host-
country contracting institutions is insignificant, but positive. Given inflated standard errors in 
Model 7, the lack of significance does not necessarily falsify a positive effect. 
We further conduct tests on the shape of the non-linear relationships, following Haans et al. 
(2015). First, we calculate the turning points for the inverted u-shapes by setting the first 
derivative zero (Haans et al., 2015). The turning point for our host-country corruption measure 
derived from the fully specified Model 7 is -0.33. This is well within our span of observations 
(-3.38 and 1.58 standard deviations). The turning point for the u-shape on corruption distance 
is at 2.65, and positioned quite centrally in relation to our scope of observations (1.07 to 5.30). 
We plot the inverted u-shapes, holding other variables at sample means in Figures 2 and 3. Plots 
for the hypothesized effects of MNC protection are positive and linear with very low variation 
across our independent variables, which is why we do not include their plots. 
----------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 & 3 
----------------------- 
There are additional interesting observations from some control variables, especially on the 
subsidiary and the MNC level. In line with past research, older subsidiaries have significantly 
more HCNs (Boyacigiller, 1990; Collings et al., 2008; Gong, 2003b; Lynall et al., 2003; Shin 
et al., 2016). Geographic distance is associated with fewer HCNs, which indicates possible 
monitoring problems in host countries that are geographically distant from MNC parents. 
Subsidiaries with large numbers of shareholders have higher proportions of HCNs. This is 
consistent with our expectation as dispersed ownership of the residual minority share will likely 
involve local shareholders, which require a signal of legitimacy and encourage local hiring. As 
expected, MNCs with a culture of hiring HCNs on average use more HCNs in our sample 
subsidiaries. MNCs that are generally more internationalized and experienced tend to use more 
HCNs, too. Furthermore, a higher level of people with tertiary education in the host country is 
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associated with a higher proportion of HCNs. Overall the results on our control variables give 
us strong confidence in the accuracy of our models. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We run a series of robustness checks to scrutinize our findings. The most pressing, but 
unfortunately inevitable, concern in our study relates to country-level sampling bias. To test if 
individual countries in our analysis drive our results, we checked for robustness, using the full 
sample (n = 4,816). Host-country corruption and the proportion of HCNs exhibit a significant 
inverted u-shaped relationship in the separate model (p = 0.025). This lends support to our 
Hypothesis 1, i.e. that the knowledge benefit of HCNs is at some point outweighed or at least 
reduced by the perceived increasing risk of collusive behavior (Trojan horses) in host countries 
with high corruption. However, the turning point for the inverted u-shape is close to the upper 
boundary of our realm of observations at 1.5 (-4 to 2) (Haans et al., 2015). Again, the 
incremental Wald test shows that adding the squared term of corruption significantly improves 
model fit (F =21.90; p = 0.000). The squared term of corruption distance is also significant 
(Wald test: F = 17.88; p = 0.000). The turning point of the inverse u-shape is 3.53 and within 
our scope of observations. Hence, MNCs are more hesitant to appoint HCNs in a context of 
high corruption distance (H2). 
In addition, we run robustness checks using only countries with at least ten observations in our 
sample, and countries for which we have at least 90%, 50% and 30% of observations (as 
compared to our full sample of 4,323 subsidiaries). We obtain qualitatively similar results. Both 
the inverted u-shapes on host-country corruption and corruption distance are significant 
throughout all sample specifications. However, the turning point for host-country corruption is 
at times beyond our scope of observations. This suggests that the Trojan horse problem may be 
more severe under conditions of corruption distance than host-country corruption. We also 
include host-country clustered standard errors with little change in results (the squared term for 
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corruption distance is significant at only at p = 0.06). Another sampling issue is whether our 
minimum size requirements for subsidiaries, i.e. focusing on subsidiaries with minimum 10 
employees and 20 million USD in sales, drive our results. We run sensitivity analyses using 
thresholds of 50, 100 and 200 employees and 20, 30 and 50 million USD in sales, but our results 
do not change. 
Second, there may be differences in staffing decisions between up- and downstream 
investments (i.e. subsidiaries where an MNC parent’s home-country corruption is higher/lower 
than subsidiary host-country corruption). For example, upstream investors may be less risk-
averse, hiring more HCNs. By nature of our sample of developing market subsidiaries, the 
majority of MNC investments are downstream. To address potential bias, we use a subsample 
of downstream subsidiaries only. We find support for all our hypotheses. The sample of 
upstream investments (n = 341) is too small for a separate analysis. Hence, we concede that our 
results may be not generalizable to upstream investments. 
Third, a number of MNC-level control variables deserve further attention: As our measures of 
MNC parent internationalization exhibits high t-statistics throughout all specifications, the 
question is if biases in these variables drive our results. To address this issue, we run robustness 
checks using MNC parent assets and employees as alternative measures of size. Our results are 
robust, although the inverted u-shape for host-country corruption (H1) is of slightly weaker 
significance (p < .1). Similarly, scaling of subsidiary EBIT with assets may affect our results. 
We run the specifications using subsidiary EBIT and subsidiary assets separately without 
changes in results. Subsidiary profitability measured as last year’s EBIT can potentially 
introduce biases because of earnings management and high EBIT volatility in general. We run 
robustness checks using three- and ten-year averages, as well as last year’s operating profit as 
robustness checks, without changes in our coefficients of interest. 
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Fourth, one concern regards potential home-country culture effects on subsidiary staffing. In 
our main specification we preferred using an MNC-specific measure of staffing culture rather 
than a home-country-level proxy. Thus, we included home-country fixed effects to control for 
MNC home-country. Also with these specifications, we find support for our hypotheses. Also, 
we include cultural distance measure from Berry et al. (2010) without changes in results, and 
run an exploratory analysis using Hofstede’s (1994) cultural dimensions (updated in 2010).  
Fifth, staffing may be related to the status of the subsidiary within the MNC and the relationship 
between the MNC parent and the subsidiary in terms of vertical or horizontal integration 
(Colakoglu et al., 2009). We lack details on the strategic roles of subsidiaries. Yet, we attempt 
to check for bias due to subsidiary roles by including a dummy variable based on sector 
similarity of the NACE 2 industry codes of the MNC parent and its subsidiary (for a similar 
approach see Shin et al., 2016). We run additional tests including the listing status of 
subsidiaries in their host countries. We also run robustness tests with clustered standard errors 
on the MNC parent-level. Throughout, our results are qualitatively identical. 
Sixth, a variable of major theoretical importance in subsidiary staffing is direct ownership share 
of the parent. To test for bias resulting from variation in ownership, we dummy-code 
subsidiaries with less than 60% parent ownership. We also run two robustness checks by 
including only subsidiaries with more than 90% parent ownership. These specifications are 
more conservative than specifications in comparable studies, which use cut-off points of 80% 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Shin et al., 2016). Our results hold across all specifications.  
Finally, an important question relates to the role, services or positions of managers included in 
our sample. In the construction of our dependent variable, we intentionally included both board 
members and top managers to achieve more generalizability in terms of subsidiary management 
staffing strategies. To address potential differences between board members and top managers, 
we run robustness checks using two separate dependent variables. The results are in line with 
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our hypotheses, despite smaller samples. Moreover, using two separate dependent variables 
also shows some interesting differences in effects: It appears that the inverse u-shape of host-
country corruption (H1) is more closely related to board staffing, while top management 
appointment is very strongly related to the inverse u-shape of corruption distance (i.e. 
familiarity with the host-country context) (H2). Because of a combination of smaller sample 
size and differences in the prevalence of subsidiary boards and/or top management teams across 
countries, these results must be interpreted with caution. Preliminary analysis shows that boards 
are more common in lower corruption host countries. As a natural consequence, the inverse u-
shape on board member staffing is truncated. This results in a consistent, but insignificant 
coefficient for the inverse u-shape on host-country corruption (H1). We do not find evidence 
for an inversely u-shaped relationship on corruption distance (H2) for board members, but 
strong support for such a trade-off for top managers. Regarding the benefits of contracting 
institutions (H3) and property rights (H4), results are largely consistent across the two groups 
with the exception of an insignificant effect of contracting institutions on HCN board members. 
DISCUSSION 
Our study analyzes the use of HCN subsidiary managers. Most international business research 
portrays HCNs as beneficial, as they can provide access to local knowledge, superior 
responsiveness to the host-country environment, signal commitment to markets, and increase 
MNCs’ legitimacy. Surprisingly, data on subsidiary managers suggests that MNCs do not take 
full advantage of these potentials. A more intriguing interpretation could be, however, that 
international business research is missing an important cost element that leads MNCs to 
willingly forgo the benefits of HCN managers. In our paper, we introduce the perceived cost of 
opportunistic behavior as one such explanation. 
Drawing on institutional theory (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008) and seminal 
works of Granovetter (1978, 1985), we acknowledge that HCNs have both increased 
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opportunities and superior incentives to abuse their position. Such potential costs and benefits 
affect subsidiary staffing by foreign MNCs. Accordingly, staffing of subsidiaries with HCN 
managers needs to be theorized and modelled as a trade-off, accounting for both benefits and 
costs (Blomqvist et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2016). Hence, our first contribution strongly resonates 
with calls for addressing trade-offs rather than unidirectional average effects in strategic 
management research, e.g. in studying foreign market entries and acknowledging both benefits 
and costs (Alcácer et al., 2013; Haans et al., 2015). 
We extend research on subsidiary management staffing in at least two important ways. First, 
theorizing about subsidiary staffing has predominantly focused on the benefits of HCNs, while 
omitting potential costs both theoretically and empirically. This omission is evident in the 
comparison of Models 1 and 2 in our analysis. When modelling subsidiary staffing only as a 
function of corruption, the benefit of HCN managers is overestimated. More importantly, it is 
implicitly assumed that this average benefit applies to all institutional settings, irrespective of 
the extent of corruption and the potential costs resulting thereof. Only when acknowledging 
potential costs and modelling a non-linear term of corruption, it becomes evident that MNCs 
refrain from hiring HCNs in contexts of high corruption.  
As a second contribution of our study, we link the cost associated with HCNs to the host-country 
institutional setting. By analyzing institutional boundary conditions of the trade-off between 
benefits and cost of HCNs, our research adds to subsidiary staffing literature from an 
institutional perspective. We show that the real or perceived threat of Trojan horses is most 
severe, when corruption is pervasive in the host country. As corruption increases, HCNs’ 
knowledge benefits are outweighed by Trojan horse cost at some point and their net effect turns 
negative. Similarly, the cost of HCNs relate to an MNC’s familiarity with the level of corruption 
in a host country, as shown in previous research (Baik and Park, 2015; Gaur et al., 2007; Shin 
et al., 2016). MNCs refrain from appointing HCNs, when the corruption distance between MNC 
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home and host country exceeds a certain point, at which the MNC can no longer efficiently 
monitor HCN managers’ behavior. 
Moreover, the costs associated with HCNs are affected by legal protection of the MNC in the 
host country. Contracting institutions, in particular, protect MNCs from misappropriation of 
value, and provide means of recovering misappropriated value. From our results in the full 
model, it appears that property rights (i.e. protection from government opportunism) have less 
of an effect on subsidiary staffing with HCNs. However, this result could be due to 
multicollinearity between the two measures of legal protection. In sum, MNCs benefit from the 
protection by legal institutions by reaping the benefits of HCNs as knowledgeable allies, while 
limiting the potential costs of illicit behavior, i.e. Trojan horse cost. 
We also gain some interesting insights into differences between subsidiary boards and top 
management. Our results are preliminary only, and further research requires proper theorizing 
on the differences between the two sub-groups. Yet, our results indicate that our hypothesized 
trade-off holds for boards, but MNCs seem to be generally more hesitant to install subsidiary 
boards in high-corruption countries. Furthermore, institutional distance appears to be more 
closely associated with fewer HCN top managers. This possibly indicates that monitoring top 
managers is more of a concern to MNCs than monitoring board members. Results on MNC 
legal protection are consistently positive for both board members and top managers. We 
interpret this as an indication that formal protection of MNCs equally applies to both board 
members and top management.  
Our results also offer important managerial and policy insights: To capitalize on HCNs’ 
knowledge benefits, MNCs should anticipate loopholes for opportunistic behavior, and assess 
options to monitor managers (familiarity). Formal legal host-country institutions can substitute 
for MNC monitoring, if they provide reliable protection of MNCs. Furthermore, MNCs may 
choose to staff their subsidiaries with non-HCN managers as a buffering strategy against host-
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country opportunism (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012). Following our trade-off model, 
however, MNCs that use expatriates to avoid the cost of HCNs also forego their potential 
benefits. Accordingly, our finding must not be mistaken for a recommendation to MNCs to 
refrain from hiring HCNs, but rather an ultima ratio: Ideally, MNCs should devise strategies to 
address potential costs of HCNs, while maintaining their benefits. 
Organizational research and research on subsidiary autonomy have offered some helpful 
insights in that respect, e.g. relating to the role of governance, incentives, reporting and 
performance evaluation (Foss et al., 2012; Gong, 2003a; Kim et al., 2005; Kostova et al., 2016; 
Mezias and Mezias, 2010). In addition, expatriate literature has provided hints for 
organizational practices to address information asymmetry and decrease Trojan horse cost on a 
micro level, e.g. short-term or virtual expatriate assignments (Collings et al., 2007; Shin et al., 
2016). On a macro level, our study suggests that policymakers in developing countries can 
potentially support the employment of HCNs in foreign MNCs’ subsidiaries by establishing 
formal legal institutions to protect MNCs. Such measures can serve as an impetus to upgrading 
HCN human capital in the long run. Corruption, by contrast, may increase the immediate need 
for HCNs in MNC subsidiaries, but this effect is likely to fade as MNCs perceive HCNs as too 
risky. 
There are a number of limitations to our study, which point to further avenues of research. First, 
as with all cross-country subsidiary staffing research, our data is potentially biased on a country 
and company level. Despite elaborate robustness checks, future research should scrutinize our 
findings in a more balanced sample of companies, ideally using panel data.  
Second, the two mechanisms proposed in our framework, namely benefits and cost of HCNs, 
cannot be measured directly. They are rather theoretically supported functions of observed 
subsidiary staffing policies (for a similar approach see Shin et al., 2016, p. 25). Hence, there is 
no empirical evidence of any wrongdoing on part of HCNs. We encourage further research to 
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address potential differences between perceived and actual costs of HCNs in a qualitative way. 
Third, we attempt to explain variation of the cost of HCNs using a perceptional country-level 
measure of corruption. Future research should develop more direct, fine grained measures of 
corruption that account for within country variation. Also, our measure focuses on public-sector 
corruption and may not fully capture private-sector norms in a country. Disentangling the 
effects of different types of corruption and developing better measures, we believe, would be a 
rewarding endeavor for future institutional research.  
Fourth, our theory and analysis was based on MNC subsidiary staffing decisions in the presence 
of institutional duality. Institutional duality creates both the need to buy into local knowledge 
and dare the potential costs associated with HCNs (as hypothesized in H1 to H4). Future 
research could address Trojan horse issues in a domestic context. It is, for example, conceivable 
that an MNC in a corrupt country may seek to avoid the cost associated with domestic managers 
by hiring foreign managers, thus completely foregoing knowledge benefits of domestic 
managers. Moreover, despite our efforts to control for company-level characteristics, further 
research should look into company-level strategies to counter Trojan horse problems and extend 
our discussion on possible company-level variation. The tasks of HCN managers (i.e. R&D, 
Finance & Accounting, Supervisory role), in particular, could be a valuable extension to our 
analysis. However, such analysis would, most likely require a larger sample of firms. 
Fifth, our study highlights some potential MNC-level boundary conditions of the Trojan horse 
problem. Though not in the focus of our analysis, we found experience-related variables 
(number of foreign subsidiaries and age) to be strongly related to the use of HCNs. We attribute 
this to MNC-specific learning capabilities, as MNCs’ perceived risk of Trojan horses is reduced 
as they learn over time. This adds an interesting extension to our study, implying that the home-
country context is not the only valuable source of learning. Rather, MNCs can learn from their 
international operations and transfer experiences to other corrupt markets.  
Page 35 
Finally, with our sample of more than 16,000 subsidiary managers and in line with other large-
sample studies (Shin et al., 2016), we are inevitably unable to control for some individual-level 
characteristics (e.g. the impact of language competence, personal traits, trustworthiness, shared 
vision, spousal context, manager experience and local social network) that may affect hiring of 
HCNs on a micro level. Such questions call for more fine-grained, qualitative studies on 
individual manager characteristics. 
Overall, our study challenges the notion that HCNs are superior to MNC home-country 
managers, by acknowledging the potential costs associated with HCNs’ knowledge and 
embeddedness. We find compelling support that the host-country institutional context is an 
important boundary condition to the potential costs and benefits related to HCN subsidiary 
managers. In particular, we find that corruption and corruption distance lead to decreasing and 
potentially negative marginal benefits of HCNs. This is in line with our hypothesized argument 
that HCNs can pose an inherent threat of being Trojan horses.  
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TABLES & GRAPHS 
Figure 1: Cost and benefit functions of HCN managers as a function of host-country institutions 
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Table 1: Sector distribution in the full sample 
Sectors Freq. Percent Cum. 
Wholesale & retail trade 834 20.7 20.7 
Other services 780 19.36 40.06 
Machinery & equipment 769 19.09 59.15 
Other 424 10.52 69.67 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics  407 10.1 79.77 
Metals & metal products 171 4.24 84.01 
Construction 123 3.05 87.06 
Food, beverages, tobacco 113 2.8 89.86 
Transport 82 2.04 91.9 
Gas, water, electricity 66 1.64 93.54 
Primary sector 60 1.49 95.03 
Post & communication 44 1.09 96.12 
Wood, cork & paper 42 1.04 97.16 
Publishing, printing 36 0.89 98.05 
Textiles, wearing & apparel 36 0.89 98.94 
Hotels & restaurants 22 0.55 99.49 
Banks 10 0.25 99.74 
Education, health 6 0.15 99.89 
Public administration 4 0.1 99.99 
Total 4,029 100.00
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Table 2: Host-country distribution in the full sample 
Host-country Freq. Percent Cum. 
*Malaysia 950 23.58 23.58 
*Czech Republic 532 13.2 36.78 
*Thailand 524 13.01 49.79 
*Romania 387 9.61 59.4 
*Poland 314 7.79 67.19 
*Russian Federation 291 7.22 74.41 
*Slovakia 211 5.24 79.65 
China 207 5.14 84.79 
*Bulgaria 83 2.06 86.85 
*Hungary 79 1.96 88.81 
*India 69 1.71 90.52 
Viet Nam 67 1.66 92.18 
South Africa 55 1.37 93.55 
Greece 36 0.89 94.44 
Chile 35 0.87 95.31 
Algeria 29 0.72 96.03 
Latvia 20 0.5 96.53 
*Lithuania 15 0.37 96.9 
Malta 13 0.32 97.22 
*Ecuador 11 0.27 97.49 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9 0.22 97.71 
*Estonia 9 0.22 97.93 
Moldova, Republic of 9 0.22 98.15 
Indonesia 8 0.2 98.35 
Egypt 7 0.17 98.52 
Brazil 6 0.15 98.67 
Colombia 6 0.15 98.82 
Mexico 6 0.15 98.97 
*Slovenia 5 0.12 99.09 
Argentina 4 0.1 99.19 
Ghana 4 0.1 99.29 
Philippines 3 0.07 99.36 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 0.05 99.41 
Jamaica 2 0.05 99.46 
Lebanon 2 0.05 99.51 
Mozambique 2 0.05 99.56 
Nigeria 2 0.05 99.61 
Paraguay 2 0.05 99.66 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.05 99.71 
Bahrain 1 0.02 99.73 
Barbados 1 0.02 99.75 
Cape Verde 1 0.02 99.77 
Cyprus 1 0.02 99.79 
Guyana 1 0.02 99.81 
Morocco 1 0.02 99.83 
Namibia 1 0.02 99.85 
Pakistan 1 0.02 99.87 
Peru 1 0.02 99.89 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.02 99.91 
Ukraine 1 0.02 99.93 
Total 4,029 100  
* Countries with higher company-level reporting of managers included in the reduced sample. To address potential 
country-level bias, we run robustness checks with the full sample, with a minimum of 10 observations per country, 
with 80, 50 and 30% non-missing management data.   
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Table 3: Home-country distribution in the full sample 
Home-country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Japan 903 22.41 40.43 
United States 726 18.02 51.5 
Germany 446 11.07 58.5 
United Kingdom 282 7 64.68 
France 249 6.18 69.67 
Singapore 201 4.99 74.24 
Switzerland 184 4.57 77.02 
Sweden 112 2.78 79.68 
Netherlands 107 2.66 82.29 
Austria 105 2.61 84.65 
Finland 95 2.36 86.78 
Belgium 86 2.13 88.82 
Denmark 82 2.04 90.41 
Ireland 64 1.59 91.97 
Australia 63 1.56 93.34 
Luxembourg 55 1.37 94.63 
Italy 52 1.29 95.87 
Korea, Republic of 50 1.24 96.99 
Spain 45 1.12 97.66 
Norway 27 0.67 98.21 
Canada 22 0.55 98.76 
Israel 22 0.55 99.13 
Portugal 15 0.37 99.25 
China 5 0.12 99.37 
Malaysia 5 0.12 99.47 
Mexico 4 0.1 99.57 
New Zealand 4 0.1 99.64 
Indonesia 3 0.07 99.71 
Taiwan, Province of China 3 0.07 99.76 
United Arab Emirates 2 0.05 99.81 
Cyprus 2 0.05 99.83 
Egypt 1 0.02 99.85 
Hungary 1 0.02 99.87 
India 1 0.02 99.89 
Iceland 1 0.02 99.91 
Jordan 1 0.02 99.93 
Kuwait 1 0.02 99.95 
Philippines 1 0.02 99.97 
Poland 1 0.02 99.99 
Total 4,029 100   
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics full sample  
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
(1) Proportion of HCN subsidiary managers 4,029 0.58 0.42 0.00 1.00 
(2) HC corruption 4,029 -0.26 0.83 -3.85 1.58 
(3) Corruption distance 4,029 0.98 0.83 0.03 6.93 
(4) HC contracting institutions 3,797 0.45 1.03 -2.76 2.66 
(5) HC property rights institutions 3,744 0.47 0.72 -2.49 1.73 
(6) Ownership share 4,029 87.43 15.28 50.04 100.00 
(7) Subsidiary profitability 3,716 0.02 1.93 -87.20 6.81 
(8) Subsidiary age 4,029 2.83 0.55 0.00 5.12 
(9) Subsidiary size 4,029 9.62 2.27 1.95 18.86 
(10) Subsidiary debt 4,029 46.56 32.73 -99.22 100.00 
(11) Subsidiary ownership 4,029 1.09 0.39 0.00 4.17 
(12) Subsidiary management size 4,029 1.47 0.59 0.69 3.33 
(13) Parent ownership 4,029 3.66 1.11 0.00 5.47 
(14) Parent avg. local managers 4,029 0.64 0.19 0.00 1.00 
(15) Parent internationalization 4,029 5.10 1.42 0.69 8.56 
(16) Geographic distance 4,029 8.24 0.98 5.75 9.80 
(17) HC tertiary education 4,029 22.34 11.15 0.06 54.00 
(18) HC avg. GDP growth 4,029 4.20 2.35 -0.92 11.48 
(19) Home-country legal origin (UK) 4,029 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
(20) Home-country legal origin (GER) 4,029 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
(21) Home-country legal origin (FR) 4,029 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Abbrev: HC = host-country 
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Table 5: Pairwise Correlations full sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Proportion of HCN managers 1.00 
 
 
  
(2) HC corruption 0.09 1.00  
  
(3) Corruption distance -0.01 -0.02 1.00  
  
(4) HC contracting institutions 0.36 0.01 -0.17 1.00  
  
(5) HC property rights institutions 0.20 -0.15 0.06 -0.07 1.00  
  
(6) Ownership share -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.10 1.00               
(7) Subsidiary profitability -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00 
  
(8) Subsidiary age 0.19 -0.03 -0.12 0.28 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 
(9) Subsidiary size -0.04 0.16 -0.07 0.06 -0.18 -0.03 -0.03 0.28 1.00 
  
(10) Subsidiary debt 0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.21 0.00 1.00 
 
(11) Subsidiary ownership 0.01 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 0.15 0.13 0.06 1.00 
 
(12) Subsidiary management size 0.15 -0.20 -0.13 0.31 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.07 1.00 
 
(13) Parent ownership 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.00 
 
(14) Parent avg. local managers 0.22 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.13 1.00 
(15) Parent internationalization 0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.45 0.00 1.00 
(16) Geographic distance 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.36 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.31 -0.19 0.09 1.00 
(17) HC tertiary education 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.04 0.36 0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.21 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.00 1.00 
(18) HC avg. GDP growth 0.06 -0.09 -0.19 0.66 -0.35 -0.15 -0.15 0.28 0.16 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.32 -0.48 1.00 
(19) Home-country legal origin (UK) 0.37 -0.20 -0.13 0.75 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 -0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.54 -0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.23 0.05 0.51 1.00 
(20) Home-country legal origin (GER) 0.19 0.47 0.35 -0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.21 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.62 -0.35 -0.22 1.00 
(21) Home-country legal origin (FR) -0.24 -0.39 0.06 -0.49 0.51 0.10 0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.23 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.30 -0.15 -0.22 -0.39 -0.25 
Abbrev: HC = host-country 
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Table 6: Variable description 
Dependent Variables 
(1) Proportion of HCN subsidiary managers Proportion of subsidiary managers that are HCNs. Source: Orbis Bureau Van 
Dijk. 
Independent Variables  
(2) Host-country corruption Subsidiary host-country public-sector corruption perception index (CPI score), 
2014 or most recent. (Standardized and inverted measure). Source: 
Transparency International (2015). 
(3) Corruption distance Absolute distance between inverted parent home-country CPI score and 
inverted host-country CPI score. Source: Transparency International (2015). 
(4) Host-country contracting institutions  Legal formalism index constructed by Djankov et al. (2003) and obtained from 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) (Standardized and inverted measure). 
(5) Host-country property rights institutions Protection against expropriation based on Polity IV’s constraint on the 
executive measure provided by Political Risk Services (Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005; Marshall and Gurr, 2012) (Standardized measure). 
Controls  
(6) Ownership share Direct ownership of the MNC parent in the subsidiary in percent, mean imputed 
Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(7) Subsidiary profitability Subsidiary EBIT of the previous year in million USD, scaled by subsidiary 
assets of the previous year. Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(8) Subsidiary age  Subsidiary age (logged). Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(9) Subsidiary size Subsidiary sales in million USD (logged). Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(10) Subsidiary debt  Subsidiary equity/debt ratio. Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(11) Subsidiary ownership  Number of shareholders of the subsidiary (logged). Source: Orbis Bureau Van 
Dijk. 
(12) Subsidiary management size Number of recorded managers in the subsidiary. Source: Orbis Bureau Van 
Dijk. 
(13) Parent ownership Number of shareholders of the MNC parent (logged). Source: Orbis Bureau 
Van Dijk. 
(14) Parent avg. local managers Average proportion of host-country national managers in all subsidiaries of the 
MNC parent. Source: Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. 
(15) Parent internationalization Number of foreign subsidiaries of the MNC parent (logged). Source: Orbis 
Bureau Van Dijk. 
(16) Geographic distance  Geographic distance between MNC parent home and subsidiary host-country 
(logged). Source: (Berry et al., 2010). 
(17) Host-country tertiary education Percentage of host-country population with tertiary education as of 2014 (or 
most recent observation). Source World Bank World Development Indicators. 
(18) Host-country avg. GDP growth Host-country 10-year average GDP/capita growth. Source World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
Home-country legal-origin dummies Home-country legal system origin in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or 
other (four dummy variables). Source: (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
Industry dummies NACE 2 industry classification codes. Source: Bureau Van Dijk. 
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Table 7: Results reduced sample  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Corruption Corruption 
squared 
Corruption 
distance 
Corruption 
distance 
squared 
Contracting 
institutions 
Property rights 
institutions 
Full 
model 
HC Corruption 0.454*** 0.167  -0.319  
(6.43) (1.37)  (-0.87) 
HC Corruption2 
 
-0.432***  -0.480***   
(-4.89)  (-4.19) 
Corruption distance 
  
0.145*** 0.477***  0.307***    
(4.77) (6.03)  (3.45) 
Corruption distance2 
  
-0.0863***  -0.0578**    
(-4.24)  (-2.58) 
HC contracting institutions 
  
0.697***  0.366 
(10.79)  (1.05) 
HC Property rights 0.561*** -0.00178 
(9.46) (-0.00) 
Ownership share -0.000950 -0.000797 -0.00168 -0.00158 -0.0000294 -0.000513 -0.000631 
 (-0.71) (-0.60) (-1.24) (-1.16) (-0.02) (-0.38) (-0.46) 
Subsidiary profitability 0.0199 0.0190 0.0197 0.0179 0.0194 0.0180 0.0157 
(1.59) (1.55) (1.57) (1.46) (1.48) (1.43) (1.28) 
Subsidiary age 0.416*** 0.385*** 0.420*** 0.418*** 0.376*** 0.384*** 0.351*** 
(9.40) (8.68) (9.44) (9.40) (8.46) (8.48) (7.69) 
Subsidiary size  -0.0203 -0.0163 -0.0140 -0.0160 -0.0226 -0.0284* -0.0242* 
(-1.80) (-1.45) (-1.24) (-1.42) (-1.94) (-2.42) (-2.06) 
Subsidiary debt 0.000622 0.000509 0.000899 0.000740 0.000730 0.000425 0.000403 
(1.03) (0.85) (1.48) (1.23) (1.17) (0.68) (0.64) 
Subsidiary ownership  0.167** 0.182*** 0.181** 0.179** 0.138* 0.150** 0.158** 
(2.99) (3.32) (3.22) (3.21) (2.49) (2.67) (2.83) 
Subsidiary management size -0.210*** -0.257*** -0.195*** -0.199*** -0.185*** -0.215*** -0.233*** 
(-4.60) (-5.53) (-4.32) (-4.41) (-3.90) (-4.48) (-4.78) 
Parent ownership  0.0380 0.0391 0.0404 0.0426 0.00714 0.0231 0.0271 
 (1.76) (1.79) (1.84) (1.96) (0.31) (1.01) (1.17) 
Parent avg. local managers 0.977*** 0.975*** 1.025*** 1.006*** 0.998*** 0.954*** 0.965*** 
(8.57) (8.55) (8.99) (8.82) (8.50) (8.09) (8.17) 
Parent internationalization 0.0495** 0.0458** 0.0558*** 0.0516** 0.0542** 0.0487** 0.0497**  
(2.98) (2.74) (3.35) (3.11) (3.16) (2.81) (2.88) 
Geographic distance -0.115*** -0.104*** -0.0524* -0.0355 -0.0780** -0.1000*** -0.0533 
 (-4.81) (-4.29) (-2.08) (-1.40) (-3.09) (-3.96) (-1.91) 
HC tertiary education 0.00808 0.0263** -0.00951 -0.00622 -0.0139* 0.0215** 0.00175 
(1.00) (3.11) (-1.18) (-0.77) (-2.38) (3.14) (0.16) 
HC avg GDP growth -0.0158 0.0142 -0.0335 -0.0390* -0.217*** -0.0151 -0.0897 
(-0.94) (0.78) (-1.93) (-2.24) (-8.53) (-0.87) (-0.91) 
Home c. legal origin (UK) 1.454*** 1.308*** 1.352*** 1.358*** 0.598*** 0.743*** 0.795*** 
(17.06) (15.47) (16.43) (16.73) (6.17) (7.72) (3.51) 
Home c. legal origin (GER) 0.943* 1.769** 1.887*** 2.059*** 1.446*** 0.510 3.139*** 
(2.51) (3.06) (5.10) (5.18) (5.56) (1.66) (6.09) 
Home c. legal origin (FR) 0.447*** 0.563*** 0.239*** 0.280*** 0.116 -0.829*** 0.354 
(5.65) (6.75) (3.34) (3.87) (1.76) (-6.92) (0.35) 
Intercept -1.615*** -1.982*** -2.173*** -2.531*** -0.604 -1.645*** -1.718** 
 (-3.33) (-4.13) (-4.23) (-4.91) (-1.25) (-3.36) (-2.63) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations (N) 3314 3314 3314 3314 3114 3094 3094 
Log likelihood_constant model -2212.0 -2212.0 -2212.0 -2212.0 -2050.7 -2031.9 -2031.9 
Log likelihood -1716.3 -1703.2 -1725.1 -1718.0 -1578.1 -1567.3 -1553.4 
Pseudo R2 0.224 0.230 0.220 0.223 0.230 0.229 0.235 
Χ2 4244.6 4454.2 4303.3 4354.2 3950.9 3872.4 3773.2 
Degrees of freedom 36 37 36 37 36 36 41 
Wald Test (F-score)  36.19  21.89     
 
Abbreviations: HC = host-country. Fractional response model (glm). Dependent variable: proportion of HCN 
subsidiary managers. t-statistics in parentheses. † p<0.1  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Figure 2: Effect plots host-country corruption full model 
 
Figure 3: Effect plot corruption distance full model 
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